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INTRODUCTION

In August 2015, comedian John Oliver set his satirical crosshairs on certain
infamous American "televangelists."' Specifically, Oliver highlighted the exorbitant
amounts of money these television preachers bring in by expositing a message
linking divine blessing with financial contributions-to that particular minister, of
course. 2 Oliver exposed how these televangelists use funds not for any societal
benefit but rather for personal gain.' One such televangelist bragged about
purchasing two multi-million dollar private jets.4 Kenneth Copeland, a Texas
megachurch pastor, rules over his own personal empire: a $6.3 million dollar estate,
complete with tennis courts and a large boathouse.s Yet even more shockingly,
Oliver revealed how the Internal Revenue Code ("the Code") facilitates tax breaks
for these televangelists. Specifically, the automatic designation of "churches" as taxexempt, and the benefits accompanying such designation, allows these preachers to
6
operate outside the federal income-tax scheme with virtually zero oversight.
Many commentators have suggested tightening the Code to avoid such abuses,
with some even calling for the outright repeal of the tax exempt status of religious
organizations.' Even some religious figures have suggested churches completely
withdraw from the tax exemption scheme in order to avoid more church/state
entanglements.' On the other hand, proponents of the status quo have pointed out
9
the nexus between tax exemption and religious organizations' functions in society.
Revoking tax exemptions would sink smaller organizations and also tighten the
tangible benefits religious organizations provide for the "least of these.""o Can the
law somehow strike the abusers without pulling the rug out from beneath the
faithful?

1 Ed Mazza, John Oliver Exposes Televangelism, Then Forms His Own Tax-Exempt Churcb,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 17, 2015, 5:41 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/john-olivertelevangelismus_55d18b8fe4b0ab468d9da515 [https://perma.cc/2QPF-ZRZ2].
2 Last Week Tonight withJohn Oliver: Televangelists (HBO television broadcast Aug. 16,2015).
3
Id.
4 Id.
s John Burnett, OnscreenBut Out ofSight, TVPreachersAvoid Tax Scrutiny, NAT'L PUB. RADIO
(Apr. 2, 2014, 4:03 PM), http-//www.npr.org/2014/04/02/298373994/onscreen-but-out-of-sight-tvpreachers-avoid-tax-scrutiny [https://perma.cc/5772-3NAY] [hereinafter Burnett, Onscreen].
6Id.
7
Mark Oppenheimer, Now's the Time to End Tax-Exemptions for Religious Institutions, TIME
http://time.com/3939143/nows-the-time-to-end-tax-exemptions-for-religious(June 28, 2015),

institutions [https://perma.cc/LH88-DUTN].

_ Mollie Reilly, Alike Huckabee: Churbes Should Reject Tax-Exempt Status, HUFFINGTON
POST (June 12, 2013, 11:54 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/12/mike-huckabeechurches n_3428481.html [https://perma.cc/YS8V-228G].
'E.g., John J. Dilulio, Jr., The Value ofNonprofits, AMERICA: NAT'L CATH. REV. (Feb. 7,2011),
http://americamagazine.org/issue/763/columns/value-nonprofits [https://perma.cc/Q2MG-WNNL].
1
o SeeMatthew25:40.

KENTUCKY LAWJOURNAL

368

Vol. 105

Religious organizations occupy a special place in American society. Statistics
suggest most citizens donate overwhelmingly more to religious organizations than
to any other nonprofit organization." These religious organizations, in turn,
undoubtedly provide a societal bedrock that government simply could not fulfill
even given the chance. 12 Beyond the tangible benefits, religious organizations
"uniquely contribute" to the diverse American tapestry." America's foundational
document-the United States Constitution-recognizes this important role in a
pluralistic society. The First Amendment explicitly prohibits the federal
government from making a "law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof."" Nonetheless, the law should also protect the
faithful from wolves in sheeps' dothing. Senator Charles Grassley keenly observed
this delicate balance: "The challenge is to encourage good governance and best
practices and so preserve confidence in the tax-exempt sector without imposing
regulations that inhibit religious freedom or are functionally ineffective."s
This Note argues for a balance between vigorously protecting religious
organizations in American society while also shielding citizens from the abuse
many charlatans have exploited in the Code. Primarily, this Note calls for oversight
of "churches" in two ways." First, this Note advocates for congressional action in
defining a sufficient "high-level Treasury official" under the Church Audit
Procedures Act required for conducting audits on houses of worship. The Treasury
Department's repeated failure to define a "high-level Treasury official" has resulted
in the lapse of crucial oversight functions established over thirty years ago through
bipartisan efforts. Without such oversight, crafty televangelists have stretched the
Code and will continue to do so with impunity. Second, this Note advocates for a
Form 990 filing requirement from churches." Naming an auditor only resolves half
the battle. The auditor must have a "reasonable belief" that the church either does
not qualify for the exemption or is not paying tax before conducting a church
audit." A Form 990 disclosure could provide the auditor with the necessary
n Christine Roemhildt Moore, Rehgious Tax Exemption and the "CharitableScrutiny" Test, 15
REGENT U.L. REV. 295, 295 (2003) (citing a Barna Research Group study).
1 See Dilulio, supra note 9.
` Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 689 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
14 U.S. CONST. amend. I.

s Lillian Kwon, Grassley Concludes Senate Probe of 'Prosperity'Televangelists, CHRISTIAN POST
(Jan. 7, 2011, 7:26 AM), http-//www.christianpost.com/news/grassley-condudes-senate-probe-ofprosperity-televangeists-48383 [https://perma.cc/N5EG-JFCN].
16 This Note uses the word "church" synonymously with the Internal Revenue Service's definition
codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1.511-2(a)(3)(ii) (2016). The Service further developed a fourteen-point test
weighing various factors in determining a church. See Lutheran Soc. Serv. v. United States, 758 F.2d
1283, 1286-87 (8th Cir. 1985). "Church" thus encompasses more than the Christian idea but also
includes other houses of worship such as synagogues or mosques.
17 What Is the IRS Form 990?, TURBOTAX.COM, https://turbotax.intuit.com/tax-tools/taxtips/IRS-Tax-Forms/What-Is-the-IRS-Form-990-/INF14515.html
[https-//perma.cc/852F-ZLHS]
(last visited Nov. 15, 2016).
1s Church Audits - "ReasonableBelef'Requirement, IRS.GOV, https://www.irs.gov/charities-nonprofits/churches-religious-organizations/church-audits-reasonable-belief-requirement
[https://perma.cc/9GKR-V9LL] (last visited Nov. 15, 2016).
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bedrock for exposing fraudulent activity. After all, other nonprofit organizations are
required to file a Form 9 90 ." Significantly, a Form 990 would help preserve the
separation of church and state found in the First Amendment by providing a
"reasonable basis" grounded in financial data rather than religious belief.
Part I of this Note examines the historical background for the religious tax
exemption and addresses the modern legal framework. Part II examines the
justifications behind tax exemptions for religious organizations, advancing the idea
that such exemptions constitute a privilege rather than a constitutional right. Part
III discusses the critical role of the Church Audit Procedures Act in making this
privilege workable under modern law, advocating for congressional action in filling
the Act's recent gaps. Part IV examines Form 990 and argues for filing
requirements from self-designated "churches." Finally, the Conclusion concludes
this Note.
I. "STANDING ON THE PROMISEs": A HISTORY OF
RELIGIOUS TAX ExEMFrONS

Historians cannot precisely pinpoint when religious tax exemptions first
appeared. Notable church/state scholar Dean M. Kelley explained:
No one can find that point in history where some great lawgiver
declared, "Come now, and let us exempt the church from
taxation, for behold! it is as part of the fabric of the state and a
pillar of the throne." There is no time before which churches
were taxed and in which we can seek the reason for exemption.20
However, ancient records and modem statutory regimes both contain various
religious tax exemptions, each buttressed by differing rationales.
A. The Ancientjudeo-ChristianWorld
Several Old Testament Biblical passages suggest that governments provided a
religious tax exemption in the ancient world. For instance, in the Book of Genesis,
Egypt exempted priests from two taxes levied in preparation for the impending
seven-year famine.21 First, the Hebrew Joseph, serving as adviser to the Egyptian
Pharaoh, purchased all land in Egypt except land held by the priests. 22 Second,

"
See What Is the IRS Form 990?, supra note 17.
20
DEAN M. KELLEY, WHY CHURCHES SHOULD NOT PAY TAXES 5 (1977).
21 Vaughn E. James, Reaping Where They Have Not Sowed- Have American Churches Failed to
Satisfy the Requirements for the ReIgious Tax Exemption?, 43 CATH. LAW. 29, 32-33 (2004).
' Genesis 47:22.
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Joseph promulgated an edict granting Pharaoh a one-fifth claim in all proceeds
from these lands-but he again exempted the priests from this claim.n
Centuries later, the Hebrews formed a Kingdom, eventually ruled by the figures
David and Solomon; both kings imposed significant taxes to fund military
campaigns and an ecclesiastical temple building, respectively.24 The populace
begged for tax relief from the onerous burden. One constituency, however,
remained untouched. The priestly Levite caste received above-average income
immune from the heavy taxation plaguing the Kingdom.26 This preferential
treatment continued following the Babylonian conquest of Israel's Kingdom. When
the Israelites returned from exile, the priests warned against imposing taxes on
religious functionaries: "You are also to know that you have no authority to impose
taxes, tribute or duty on any of the priests, Levites, musicians, gatekeepers, temple
servants or other workers at this house of God."27
The Christian Church initially adopted a different stance toward taxation.
Pressed by religious authorities on whether Jews should pay the Roman tax
collectors, Jesus himself declared, "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's,
and to God the things that are God's." Thus, Jesus supported paying taxes.
Furthermore, the apostle Paul echoed this position. In his epistle to the Roman
church, Paul noted: "This is also why you pay taxes, for the authorities are God's
servants, who give their full time to governing. "29 Both Jesus and Paul addressed
religious authorities and carved out no exceptions, as found in the Old Testament.
Everyone must render unto Caesar; everyone must pay imperial taxes.
This position changed, however, with the advent of imperial Christendom. The
Roman Emperor Constantine issued the Edict of Toleration in 313 C.E." This
imperial decree placed Christianity on an equal footing with the traditional
imperial religion. After his own conversion, Constantine also started bestowing
imperial favors on the ascending Christian church. Among these favors: exemption
from certain Roman taxes."1 Although subsequent emperors, such as Diocletian,
revoked these benefits, many-including the various tax exemptions-remained
deeply entrenched within Roman society.3 2
Nonetheless, religious tax exemption suffered a tumultuous fate following
Rome's collapse. Some rulers, such as England's Henry II, continued the tradition

Genesis 47:24-26.
supra note 21, at 34.
2 See 1 ings 12:4 ("Your father put a heavy yoke on us, but now lighten the harsh labor and the
heavy yoke he put on us, and we will serve you.").
26 James, supra note 21, at 33-34 (citing MARTIN A. LARSON & C. STANLEY LOWELL, THE
2

24

James,

CHURcHEs: THEIR RICHES, REVENUES, AND IMMUNITIES 15 (1969)).
27

2

Ezra 7:24.

8 Mark 12:17; see also Matthew22:21.
29 Romans 13:6.
'James, supra note 21, at 35-36.
31 Keith S. Blair, Praying for a Tax Break: Churches, Poltical Speech, and the Loss of Section
501 (c)(3) Tax Exempt Status, 86 DENV. U.L. REv. 405, 408 (2009).
32
James, supra note 21, at 36.
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in limited circumstances." Others outright repealed the ecclesiastical preference.
The Holy Roman Empress Maria Theresa, for instance, reformed her tax code so
that her empire collected revenues from clergy.3 4 After all, burgeoning empires
needed filled coffers, and exempting classes wholesale from tax proved perverse to
the imperial expansion of the crown.
B. EarlyAmerican Society
Religious tax treatment differed by colony in pre-Revolutionary American
society. Many settlers in the so-called New World desired freedom from oppressive
European monarchies, especially with regard to the exercise of religion. This desire
did not have universal application, however, especially in the intersection between
colonial government and organized religion. On the one hand, more tolerant
colonies allowed taxpayers a choice in determining which religious organizations
received aid collected from the taxpayer. Georgia and Maryland, for instance,
allowed such an election from a general tax assessment. 35 Other colonies, however,
forbade tax aid for religious societies not falling within such colonies' established
churches. Massachusetts levied a tax on all citizens supporting the established
Congregational Church while simultaneously exempting the Church from paying
taxes." In short, each colony featured a tax scheme supporting some religious
organization.
Following the American Revolution, the colonies, now crystallized as
states in a federal union, disestablished the various churches. Yet tax exemptions
survived despite the lack of explicit Constitutional provision. At the state level,
Pennsylvania led the charge by enacting a state constitutional amendment that
barred levying a tax on church property.3 ' At the federal level, Congress exempted
religious societies from taxes levied against various items such as imports" and
household furniture." When Congress crafted a preliminary income taxing statute
in 1894, the Act explicitly exempted "corporations, companies, or associations
organized and conducted solely for charitable, religious, or educational purposes."4
4
Although the Supreme Court later struck down this Act on other grounds, 1 this
language persists in the modern statutory scheme.

3 Id.
MARGARET R. HUNT, WOMEN IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY EUROPE 327 (2010).
3

James, supra note 21, at 38.
36 Id. at 38-39.
3
1 d. at 40.
3
Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 677 (1970) (citing 6 Stat. 116 (1813)).
3 Id. At 677, n.6 (citing 6 Stat. 346 (1826)).
4 28 Stat. 509, 556 (1894).
41 See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Tr. Co. of New York, 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895).
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C. Modern StatutoryFramework
Congress finally taxed income successfully after passage of the Sixteenth
Amendment 42 and the Revenue Act of 1913.43 The Revenue Act has received
numerous revisions and supersessions over the last one hundred years. The
language first embedded in the Act's 1894 precursor exempting religious
organizations, however, has persistently survived. Currently, 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3)
exempts groups "organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster
national or international amateur sports competition."" So long as a group satisfies
an exempt purpose-and, significantly, does not privately inure or benefit an
individual 45-the group does not pay federal income taxes. Most groups qualifying
for tax-exempt status must receive a ruling from the Internal Revenue Service ("the
Service") before reaping § 501 benefits. Additionally, since 1950, the Code has also
required most tax-exempt organizations to file a Form 990 with the Service
disclosing certain information such as income, expenses, and revenue sources.'
However, the Service requires no formal filing from "churches." Self-declared
churches automatically receive tax-exempt status.47 At present, churches need not
file Form 990s with the Service, even though the parent category of "religious
organization" must file such a form with the Service."
II. "ISHALL NOT BE MOVED":JURISPRUDENTIAL
RATIONALIZATION OF RELIGIOUS TAX EXEMPTIONS

The numerous tax-exemption statutes involving churches have not only
monetarily advanced religious institutions, but have also imposed only minor
oversight monitoring how churches use these tax-free funds. Indeed, churches have
greatly benefited from this preferential treatment. An estimated 330,000 churches
in the United States received over $34 billion collectively in revenue and
contributions in 2010.49 Studies further estimate that American churches own
approximately $300-$500 billion in untaxed property.5 New York City alone loses
nearly $627 million in annual property tax revenue due to exempted churches in the
42 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI ("The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes,
from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to
any census or enumeration.").
43 38 Stat. 114 (1913).
- 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
45 Id
'John Montague, The Lawand FinancialTransparencyin Churches:Reconsideringthe Form 990
Exemption, 35 CARDozo L. REv. 203, 213 (2013).
4726 U.S.C. § 508(c)(1)(A) (2012).
4 Id. § 6033(a)(3)(A)(i).
4Montague, supra note 46, at 206.
so Jeff Schweitzer, The Church of America, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 11, 2011, 3:49 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeff-schweitzer/robert-jeffress-romneyb-1002753.html
[https://perma.cc/C75H-K8YX].
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City's jurisdiction.s' Kenneth Copeland himself would owe $660,000 in property
taxes but for the exemption. 52
Should churches continue enjoying this treatment? Many churches argue that
these tax exemptions constitute a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution's First Amendment.s" Using the very same Amendment, opponents
argue that tax exemptions only represent a pivilege, and this privilege may even
violate the First Amendment wholesale.s4 Both arguments represent a fundamental
tension in the First Amendment recognized by the United States Supreme Court
in Walz v. Tax Commission of New York.5 Resolving the tax abuse exposed by
John Oliver requires unknotting the Supreme Court's unfortunately convoluted
precedent in this area.
A. Tax Exemption as a Rght

.

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution prevents Congress
from "prohibiting the free exercise" of religion." Churches argue that revoking tax
exemption would violate this constitutional principle." After all, the United States
Supreme Court recognized early that "[a]n unlimited power to tax involves,
necessarily, a power to destroy."5s Furthermore, the Court opined the "power to
confer or withhold unlimited benefits is the power to coerce or destroy."59 More
recently, the Court acknowledged the adverse effects taxation could have on
religious beliefs: "[I]t is of course possible to imagine that a more onerous tax rate
. . might effectively choke off an adherent's religious practices . . . ."6o Thus,
churches argue, revoking churches' exemptions from tax might result in the
destruction of free religious exercise as protected by the Constitution.

s Doug Turetsky, Citys Multitude ofProperty Tax Exemptions Add Up to a Wealth of Revenue
Foregone, INDEP. BUDGET OFF. WEB BLOG (July 15, 2011), http://ibo.nyc.ny.us/cgi-park/?p=365

[https://perma.cc/3TDC-MY6X].
52 Burnett, Onscreen, supra note 5.

* SeeWalz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970) (holding that tax exemptions
"restrict[] the fiscal relationship between church and state, and tend[] to complement and reinforce the
desired separation insulating each from the other").
54 See id. at 716 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("If believers are entitled to public financial support, so are
nonbelievers.").
5 Id. at 668-69 ("The Court has struggled to find a neutral course between the two Religion
Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme,
would tend to dash with the other.").
' U.S. CONST. amend. I.
s1 See Erik Stanley, IRS Rules Don't Trump the Constitution, TOWNHALL.COM (Sept. 8, 2008,

PM),

1:50
http://townhall.com/columnists/erikstanley/2008/09/08/irs-rules

dont_trump-the-constitution/page/f

ull [https:/perma.cc/DBJ3-N22A].
51 M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 327 (1819).
" United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 71 (1936).
'Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 392 (1990).
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The Supreme Court has rejected this position, however. First, the Supreme
Court has allowed some restrictions on religious exercise. "Not all burdens on
religion are unconstitutional," Chief Justice Burger noted.' With regard to taxes,
the Court also concluded: "[T]o the extent that imposition of a generally applicable
tax merely decreases ... money [spent on] . . . religious activities, any such burden
is not constitutionally significant."62 Thus, tax-exempt status for churches does not
exist as a foundational right. Instead, so long as a generally applicable tax does not
"burden the defendant's practice of his religion by pressuring him to commit an act
forbidden by the religion or by preventing him from engaging in conduct that the
faith mandates,"' churches theoretically could pay the tax under the United States
Constitution.
B. Tax Exemption andthe SeparationBetween Church and State
Some commentators argue the tax exemptions proffered upon churches violate
the First Amendment's other provision: the Establishment Clause. 64 After all, the
First Amendment also prohibits the federal government from making a "law
respecting an establishment of religion."s Favoring churches through tax
exemptions seemingly violates this separation. As Mark Twain noted, "[N]o
church property is taxed and so the infidel and the atheist and the man without
religion are taxed to make up the deficit in the public income thus caused." 66 These
tax exemptions seem the very evil the First Amendment's Establishment Clause
redressed.6 ' Even the United States Supreme Court commented on the preferential
nature of tax exemptions. Justice Rehnquist wrote: "Both tax exemptions and tax
deductibility are a form of subsidy that is administered through the tax system. A
tax exemption has much the same effect as a cash grant to the organization of the
amount of tax it would have to pay on its income."68
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the United States Supreme Court summed up the test
for determining whether a government initiative violates the Establishment
Clause.69 The test features three prongs. First, the government's actions must have
an underlying secular purpose.o Second, the government's actions must not

United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982).
JimmySwaggartA1iistris,493 U.S. at 391.
' United States v. Washington, 672 F. Supp. 167, 170 (M.D. Pa. 1987).
6
' U.S. CONST. amend. I.
65
61

2

Id

66 ALBERT BIGELOW PAINE, MARK TWAIN'S NOTEBOOK 223 (1935).
67 See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436,
1450 (2011) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (discussing Madisonian origins of the Establishment Clause).
68 Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983).
69 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
7
Id. at 612.
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promote or inhibit religious exercise." Third, the government's actions must not
intricately entangle church and state.72
The Supreme Court applied these prongs in Hernandez and concluded
religious tax benefits do not violate the Establishment Clause.' The Court in
Hernandeznoted: "[A] statute primarily having a secular effect does not violate the
Establishment Clause merely because it 'happens to coincide or harmonize with the
tenets of some or all religions.""I4 Tax exemptions, the Court concluded, do not
endorse religion in general or any "particular religious practice."75 As such, tax
exemptions do not violate the constitutional boundaries between the state and the
church.
C. Tax Exemption as a "Rationaiized"Privilege
The United States Supreme Court has thus charted a middle ground between
the logical extremes of the First Amendment's Religion Clauses concerning tax
exemption. Tax exemption does not exist as a right, but neither does tax exemption
violate the neutral principles required by the Establishment Clause. As such,
churches' tax-exempt status exists as a privilege. This aligns with the Court's overall
view of exemptions generally. The Court has considered "[t]he availability of [tax]
7
exemptions . . . [as] a legislative grace, not a constitutional privilege." ' Lower
courts have used this logic in cases involving church taxes. The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals, for example, opined: "Tax exemptions are matters of legislative
grace and taxpayers have the burden of establishing their entitlement to
exemptions. "n7

What Congress giveth, Congress may also taketh away. If tax exemptions exist
as a legislative grace, what rationales buttress their continued existence? The
Supreme Court has enunciated two principles underlining churches' tax exemption
status. These rationales inform when a church should retain tax exemption without
violating either principle of the First Amendment. These principles, however,
sharply conflict. Delineating a path between these rationales highlights how
Congress can address the tax abuse problems perpetuated today while faithfully
respecting both church interests and state interests.

Id
nId. at 613.
Hernandez v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 696 (1989).
Id. (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961)).
Id. (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment)).
76 Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 643 n.2 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
n Christian Echoes Nat'1 Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 854 (10th Cir. 1972).
71
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i. Walz v Tax Commission ofNew York
The United States Supreme Court first addressed religious tax exemptions in
the landmark case Walz v. Tax Commission of New York. In that case, a New
York property owner sought an injunction against the New York Tax Commission
from granting tax exemptions for religious organizations." The Court upheld the
tax exemptions, however, noting the "unbroken practice of according the [tax]
exemption to churches" as "not something to be lightly cast aside."" As such, Chief
Justice Burger illuminated the proper rationale for preserving this "unbroken
practice." Writing for the Court, the Chief Justice concluded: "The State has an
affirmative policy that considers [religious organizations] as beneficial and
stabilizing influences in community life and finds this classification useful,
desirable, and in the public interest."so A concurring Justice Brennan agreed,
noting: "[G]overnment[s] grant[] exemptions to religious organizations because
they uniquely contribute to the pluralism of American society by their religious
activities.""s Thus, the Supreme Court found in Walz a sufficient rationale for tax
exemption in the public benefit provided by religious organizations.
The Court explicitly rejected any "social welfare" test for religious tax
exemptions: "We find it unnecessary to justify the tax exemption on the social
welfare services or 'good works' that some churches perform for parishioners and
82
others . . . ."
Such a yardstick, the Court warned, might upset the delicate balance
between the First Amendment's Religion Clauses. At present, "[t]he exemption
creates only a minimal and remote involvement between church and state . . . ""A
social welfare test might ". . . conceivably give rise to confrontations that could
escalate to constitutional dimensions."84 Justice Brennan departed slightly on this
point, insisting the first principle underlying religious tax exemption did rest in a
social welfare theory: "First, [religious] organizations are exempted because they,
among a range of other private, nonprofit organizations contribute to the wellbeing of the community in a variety of nonreligious ways, and thereby bear burdens
. . . met by general taxation, or be left undone, to the detriment of the
community."" Justice Brennan's concurrence forecasted the direction the Supreme
Court would soon take regarding tax exemption.

78

Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 666 (1970).
* Id. at 678.
0 Id. at 673.
81 Id. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring).
2 Id. at 674.
83 Id. at 676.
4 Id. at 674.
' Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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ii. Bob Jones Universityv. United States
Just thirteen years later, the Supreme Court heavily undermined the plurality
rationale provided in Walz. In Bob Jones University v. United States, the Service
revoked tax exemption from a Christian university because of the University's racial
discrimination.1 6 Again writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger now insisted:
". . . [U]nderlying all relevant parts of the Code, is the intent that entitlement to
tax exemption depends on meeting certain common-law standards of charitynamely, that an institution seeking tax-exempt status must serve a public purpose
and not be contrary to established public policy."" Furthermore, the Court wrote:
". . . [I]n enacting . . .

§ 501(c)(3), Congress sought to provide tax benefits to

-

-

charitable organizations, to encourage the development of private institutions that
serve a useful public purpose or supplement or take the place of public institutions
of the same kind.""
Chief Justice Burger seemingly moved beyond his thinking in Walz. Although
Bob Jones University involved primarily an educational institution (though also
classified as a religious organization), the Court nonetheless couched the opinion as
concerning all organizations exempted from tax under § 501(c)(3). In fact, the
Court disavowed the argument in Waz against a social benefit by elaborating:
The exemption from taxation of money or property devoted to
charitable and other purposes is based upon the theory that the
Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief
from financial burdens which would otherwise have to be met by
appropriations from other public funds, and by the benefits
resulting from the promotion of the general welfare."

90
Bob Jones University revoked the tax exemption on public policy grounds.
The Court also, however, integrated the common-law principles of charity into the
exemption requirement of § 501(c)(3)." This suggested that a tax-exempt
organization under § 501(c)(3) could lose exemption status if the organization did
not pass a "charitable scrutiny" test. Initially, the Court noted "advancement of
religion" as a charitable purpose. 92 However, the Court also discussed how
"charitable purposes" change over time." Some legal commentators feared the
Court's actions would make § 501(c)(3) a weapon against religious institutions

Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 579 (1983).
*Id. at 586.
" Id. at 587-88.
* Id. at 590 (quoting H.R. Rep No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 19 (1938)).
*Id. at 591.
91 Id. at 585-86.
92 Id. at 589 (citing Cornm'rs v. Pemsel, AC 531, 583 (Eng. 1891)).
* Seeid. at 593 n.20.
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utilizing this scrutiny." Even Chief Justice Roberts recently echoed these concerns
in his dissent in the landmark Obergefell same-sex marriage case.95
III. "BEYOND THE GATES": REVITALIZING THE
CHURCH AUDIT PROCEDURES ACT

Both Walz and Bob fones University recognized tax exemptions as a privilege
rather than a constitutional right. Whereas Walz focused on protecting churches
based on pluralism, Bob Jones University advocated for stronger governmental
oversight based on "charitable scrutiny." The tension generated by those two cases
resulted in the Church Audit Procedures Act." In passing the Church Audit
Procedures Act, Congress provided churches with necessary safeguards without
unnecessarily hampering the Service's auditing abilities or their need to combat
abuse. The Act largely succeeded in quelling fears, producing little controversyand even less scholarship"--over the Act's thirty-plus year history. A technicality
left unaddressed since the Service's reorganization in 1998, however, has largely
gutted the Act's efficacy.
Congress should amend the Church Audit Procedures Act and define the
currently ambiguous "high-level Treasury official" necessary for an audit sign-off.
Furthermore, Congress should codify the Internal Revenue Service Commissioner,
at the very least, as such a necessary official. Having the Commissioner as the
statutorily defined "high-level Treasury official" would allow the Service to conduct
church audits once again. The Commissioner would also satisfy the underlying
historical rationales behind the Act. Furthermore, both churches on the one hand
and nonprofit watchdogs on the other hand would likely find the Commissioner an
acceptable choice. Thus, Congress could amend the Church Audit Procedures Act
with little controversy.
A. Historyof the Church Audit ProceduresAct and the
CurrentStatutory Framework
Representative Mickey Edwards and Senator Charles Grassley introduced the
first Church Audit Procedures Act shortly after Bob Jones University. Senator
Grassley specifically noted the Act "should assist both the church under
examination and the Internal Revenue Service in a tax audit and resolve clearly

9

See Moore, supra note 11, at 323-24 (discussing how churches could meet a charitable scrutiny

test).
9s Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2626 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("Indeed, the
Solicitor General candidly acknowledged that the tax exemptions of some religious institutions would be
in question if they opposed same-sex marriage.").
9 26 U.S.C. § 7611 (2015).
9 See J. Michael Martin, Why Congress Adopted the Church Audit Procedures Act and What
Must Be Done Now to Restore the Law for Churchesand the IRS, 29 AKRON TAX J. 1, 3 n.7 (2014)
(noting the lack of scholarship on the Church Audit Procedures Act).
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defined issues quickly in consonance with our Constitution."` The Act received

broad bipartisan support.99 Not only did the Act receive support from both
Democrats and Republicans, but also, and more importantly, from religious figures
and Service auditors.100
Congress passed and codified the Church Audit Procedures Act at 26 U.S.C. §
7611. Most importantly, the Church Audit Procedures Act requires that a "highlevel Treasury official" initiate an audit against an organization classified as a
church by the Service. 0' To do so, the Treasury official must have a reasonable
belief that the church either: does not actually constitute a church under the
Regulations; conducts an unrelated, taxable trade or business; or engages in
otherwise taxable activity under the Code. 02 The Act also includes restrictions on
examinations,103 notice requirements,10 4 and pre-examination conferences between
targeted churches and the Service.' These initial procedural safeguards effectively
protected churches without significantly hindering the Service's interests in
ferreting out fraud for nearly fifteen years. The term "high-level Treasury official"
currently remains undefined, however, essentially gutting the Church Audit
Procedures Act.
B. The ChurchAudit ProceduresAct Post-Living Word
Both legislative history and practical effect defined the "high-level Treasury
official" as an Internal Revenue Service Regional Commissioner. 0 6 Yet Congress
eliminated the Regional Commissioner position in 1998 when restructuring the
Service,o' but failed to redefine who qualified as a "high-level Treasury official" in
the aftermath.o's The Service tried vesting this power in the Director of Exempt

9 130 CONG. REC. 9,152 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1984) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
9 Martin, supra note 97, at 25.
10

1Id. at 7-12.

10126 U.S.C. § 7611(a)(2)
102

(2015).

Id

-n Id. § 7611(b).
1
1 d. § 7611(a)(3), (b)(2)-(3).
101 Id. § 7611(b)(3)(A)(iii).
106 See 130 CONG. REC. S4,485-86 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1984) (statement of Sen. Grassley) ("[T]his
provision requires an Internal Revenue Service Regional Commissioner to begin an investigation of a

church"); see alsoUnited States v. Living Word Christian Ctr., No. 08-mc-37, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
106639, at *14-15 (D. Minn. Nov. 18, 2008) ("The IRS's identification of the Regional Commissioner
as the appropriate official to make the required reasonable-belief determinations is not surprising given
that the House Conference Report for the CAPA made the same selection.") (citing H.R. CONF. REP.

No. 98-861, at 1101 (1984)).
" Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112

Stat. 685, 697-98 (1998).
- Living Word ChristianCtr., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106639, at *23 ("The failure of Congress to
redefine the meaning of'appropriate high-level Treasury official' since instructing the IRS to reorganize
itself.. . has rendered the statutory definition ambiguous.").
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Organizations, Examinations ("DEOE").o' However, one church resisted the
Service's audit, claiming the DEOE did not satisfy congressional intent in naming
a "high-level Treasury official."' 10 The church argued "the DEOE does not have
responsibilities over the many different IRS functions and types of taxpayers.""'
The court agreed with the church's interpretation. The court opined: "Congress
dearly wanted the decision to investigate a church to be approved by a high-level
Executive Branch official."" 2 The DEOE did not qualify as such because the
DEOE, as an examiner, was "at odds with the legislative purpose of vesting the
authority to halt over-zealous examination of churches in a high-level Treasury
official.""' Unlike the former Regional Commissioners, the DEOE did not have:
The broad responsibilities and experience of an official with such
a high-profile position [that] would make it likely that she has a
heightened political and policy sensitivity for balancing the need
for vigorous enforcement of our tax laws and the avoidance of
excessive government intrusion into a church's exercise of
religious freedom.' 14
Following Living Word, the Service proposed having the Director of Exempt
Organizations serve as the requisite "high-level Treasury official.""s As one
commentator noted, however, the Service offered no justifications for why an
official merely one rank above the DEOE should satisfy congressional intent." 6
Comments for the proposal overwhelmingly reflected disapproval."' The Treasury
thus backed off from the approach. Subsequently, the Freedom From Religion
Foundation brought suit attempting to force the Service to name a sufficient
official."' Although the suit settled and the Service indicated that church audits
would proceed once more, the Service has not revealed which official satisfies a
"high-level Treasury" position."' All information suggests the Service has largely

.

i
Id. at *18 (citing Internal Revenue Manual § 4.76.7.4 (June 1, 2004) ("The IRS may begin a
church tax inquiry only when the Director, [Exempt Organizations] Examinations reasonably believes .

no Id. at *4-5.

"I Id. at *32.
112 Id. at *35.
n1 Id. at *39.

Id. at *35.
Martin, supranote 97, at 16 (citing 74 Fed. Reg. 39,003 (proposed Aug. 5, 2009) (to be codified
at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301)).
114
115

116Id

n1 Id. at 16-19.
" Scott Bauer, Atheist Group Sues over Relgious Electioneering, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.
(Nov. 15, 2012, 8:51 AM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-atheist-group-sues-overreligious-electioneering-2012nov15-story.html [https://perma.cc/2D2Y-YE9A]; see also Complaint at
2, Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Shulman, 961 F. Supp. 2d 947 (W.D. Wis. 2013) (No. 12CV-818).
"' Kimberly Winston, IRSAgrees to Monitor Churcbesfor Electioneering,WASH. POST (July 21,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/religion/irs-agrees-to-monitor-churches-for-
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stopped auditing churches altogether. In fact, Marcus Owens, a tax attorney and
former DEOE at the Service, noted in 2014 that the Service had not conducted
any church audits since Living Word.12' No new data suggests the Service has
changed in the interim years.'21
This cessation has greatly benefited those abusing the current tax system. The
televangelists masquerading as churches, as noted above, have reaped huge benefits
from the lack of oversight. Yet the Church Audit Procedures Act did not intend
this result. Legislative history even suggests the Church Audit Procedures Act had
in mind the evasion practiced by modem televangelists. Representative Mickey
Edwards claimed the Act protected churches without hindering the Service's
sincere efforts in ferreting out fraud, specifically noting the rapid growth of "mailorder ministries" attempting to define themselves as churches for illegal tax shelter
purposes: "[Y]ou should be aware of the deep appreciation for the IRS efforts to
uncover organizations which seek to evade taxes by fraudulently portraying
themselves as churches."22
C. Congress ShouldAmend the ChurchAudit ProceduresAct and
Name the InternalRevenue Service Commissioner as a
Sufficient "High-LevelTreasury Official"
Unfortunately, the Service has punted on the issue. The Service's relative silence
over the last few years suggests the Service does not intend on acting anytime soon
on formalizing a "high-level Treasury official" sufficient for conducting church
audits. Not only that, but the Service has continually declined to comment on
exactly why no action has commenced.12 Treasury officials merely state that the
work is ongoing. 124 This gives the Service technical grounds for deflecting concern
over church tax abuse. The Service likely does not desire wading into the murky
depths of First Amendment concerns when conducting church audits.
Hamstringing audit requests by gutting the statutory basis provides the Service
with the necessary escape hatch.
5 4 5 90
6_story.html
a6
electioneering/2014/07/21/99815d32-1118-11e4-ac56-773e
[https://perma.cc/3M9S-MJHZ].
120 Burnett, Onscreen, supra note 5.
121 See Sarah Eekhoff Zy1stra, Why the IRS Has Stopped Auditing Churches-Even One that
Calls President Obama a Musirn, CHRISTIANITY
TODAY
(Oct.
26,
2012),
http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2012/october-web-only/why-irs-has-stopped-auditing-churcheseven-one-that-calls-p.html [https://perma.ccX4EL-KX9G].
m Church Audit ProceduresAct: HeatingBefore the Subcomm. on Oversight ofthe IR.S. of the
Comm. on Fin., 98th Cong. 16 (1983) (statement of Rep. Mickey Edwards).
m John Burnett, Can A Television Network Be a Church? The IRS Says Yes, NAT'L PUB. RADIO
(Apr. 1, 2014, 4:00 PM), httpl//www.npr.org/2014/04/01/282496855/can-a-television-network-be-achurch-the-irs-says-yes [https://perma.cc/9Z6W-LXC4] [hereinafter Burnett, Can a Television
Be a Church?].
Network
12 4
Martin, supra note 97, at 21 n.100.
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This does not mean, however, the prevalent abuse in the system should go
unaddressed. Given the Service's failure in this area, Congress should amend the
Act and name a sufficient "high-level Treasury official." After all, Congress created
the problem when revamping the Service by not amending the Act in 1998.
Furthermore, Congress has already acknowledged the rampant abuse. Senator
Charles Grassley-an early sponsor of the Church Audit Procedures Act-started
an inquiry into the country's most extravagant "churches" after receiving complaints
about the exorbitant sums televangelists appropriated for themselves. 125 Senator
Grassley made his intent clear: "My business is the enforcement of the tax laws and
the integrity of the tax code . . . ."'2 Grassley's inquiry found clear abuse amongst

'

the targeted televangelists.' 27 In the end, however, many religious leaders worried
about facing tax persecution. Facing pressure, Senator Grassley merely concluded,
"Now we hope that this will cure itself through self-regulation."' 2
As John Oliver's recent expos6 demonstrated, however, the Senator's hopes did
not translate into reality. The very same televangelists targeted by Senator
Grassley's investigation have continued gaming the system in order to "bestow
Wall Street-size benefits on ... ministers." 129 As such, Congress must take action.
This starts with amending the Act so that it can functionally provide the necessary
balance between church and state for auditing purposes.
Congress must first designate statutorily a "high-level Treasury official."
Congress could select a wide range of officials sufficient for conducting church
audits. On the one hand, the statute already clearly contemplates the Treasury
Secretary.' 30 The Secretary likely prioritizes church audits as very low, however, and
at any rate has not signed off on any audits in five years. On the other hand, the
federal court in Living Word rejected the DEOE as a high-level official and
comments on the Treasury's next suggestion, the DEO, have suffered nearuniversal contempt. Former DEO Lois Lerner's recent spotlight has not improved
the argument for the DEO as the sufficient official, either.' 3 1 Thus, Congress likely
could not viably select the DEO or any lower position. As such, Congress should
select an official between the Treasury Secretary and the DEO.
Of all the candidates available, the Internal Revenue Service Commissioner
likely seems the most viable option. Former DEOE Marcus Owens ". . . identified

two important characteristics that the official responsible for approving church tax
m' Kathy Lohr, SenatorProbes Megachurches'Finances,NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 4, 2007, 7:57
PM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=16860611
[https://perma.cc/QZU6P959].
126
127

d.

See id
12
' Burnett, Onscreen, supra note 5.
129 Memorandum from Theresa Pattara & Sean Barnett on Review of Media-Based Ministries to
Sen. Charles Grassley, at 30 (Jan. 6,2011) [hereinafter Memorandum from Pattara & Barnett].
130 26 U.S.C. § 7611(h)(7) (2015).
131 See Reuters, Senate IRS Investigation Leads to Mixed Feeings, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 5,
2015,
9:14
PM),
http-//www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/irs-investigation-loislerner us 55c2bcfe4b0d9b743dade89 [https://perma.cc/AJ9Q-T724].
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inquiries at the IRS should possess to be consistent with congressional intent: (1)
experience making high-level sensitive policy judgments, and (2) lack of direct
involvement in church tax enforcement."1 3 2 The Commissioner certainly has the
requisite political publicity and distance from church auditing to serve
congressional purposes. First, the Commissioner is no stranger to high stakes
decision-making. The Commissioner has, amongst other duties, the role of "overall
planning, directing, controlling and evaluating IRS policies, programs, and
performance.""' Second, because of these sensitive decisions, the Commissioner
receives more scrutiny than any other tax official. After all, the President of the
United States appoints the Commissioner with the advice and consent of the
Senate. 3 This political process serves as an initial check on the Commissioner.
Recent events also highlight the wisdom in selecting the Commissioner as the
official. In the wake of the Tea Party tax exemption scandals, Commissioner
Steven T. Miller resigned.' An overzealous Commissioner-and, perhaps, even a
lackadaisical Commissioner-could face the same political pressure involving
church audits. Finally, as the overall head of the Service, the Commissioner would
have a sufficient distance from church audits such that signing off on them would
not reflect a personal judgment so much as a measured analysis of the financial data
available.
Furthermore, the American Center for Law and Justice endorsed this
approach.13 6 The Center argued that naming the Commissioner as the appropriate
official would have the additional benefit of avoiding any repeat problems should
Congress restructure the Service again."' The Commissioner position, after all,
would likely survive any Service shakeup in the future. Religious organizations such
as the Alliance Defending Freedom would also likely endorse this approach, given
that they have advocated for a lower official in the past."' One legal commentator
noted that the Commissioner might not function as the most practical choice given
the Commissioner's other tax responsibilities." Yet this would ensure only the
most noteworthy (and egregious) churches undergo audits. In balance, the Internal
Revenue Service Commissioner thus seems the best choice for the Church Audit
Procedures Act's "high-level Treasury official." As such, Congress should amend
the Act accordingly and breathe new life into this currently paralyzed auditing tool.

132 Martin, supra note 97, at 18.
33

' Internal Revenue Manual § 1.1.5.1(2) (June 2, 2015).
1 Id. § 1.1.5.1(5).
135 Zachary A. Goldfarb & Juliet Eilperin, Acting Director ofIRS Resigns Amid Furor Over
2013),
15,
(May
POST
WASH.
Groups,
Conservative
of
Targeting
https//www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2013/05/15/acting-irs-director-steve-millerresigns/ [https://perma.cc/P7YY-MQP8].
136 Martin, supra note 97, at 18.
137
1d.
138
See id.
139

Id. at 24.
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IV. "HEAVENLY SUNLIGHT": FORM 990 AND INCREASED
FINANCIAL TRANSPARENCY

Revitalizing the Church Audit Procedures Act would make significant inroads
toward fighting the abuse perpetuated by televangelists. Amending the Act,
however, would only partially solve the problem. The "high-level Treasury official"
would still need a "reasonable belief" for conducting an audit. 40 Yet televangelists
currently abusing the Code have largely operated without any oversight. Financial
documents necessary for an adequate audit largely remain concealed. Absent
satirical television segments, any auditor may struggle in marshalling evidence
necessary for a "reasonable belief" Even Congress could not reach into the
televangelists' shadowy financial records under current law. Tellingly, one of the six
televangelists targeted by Senator Grassley's investigation did not even respond to
the Senator's request for financial records."' Three others made no good faith
attempt toward providing the adequate documentation requested by the Senator. 42
The Form 990 would provide the Commissioner with sufficient "reasonable
belief' in signing off on church audits. The Code currently requires § 501(c)(3)
exempt organizations to file a Form 990 with the Service. The 990 sets forth
such items as an organization's gross income, related expenses, and gifts and
contributions received."' Generally, the Service relies heavily on a Form 990 when
reviewing the nonprofits' tax-exempt status.11s
The Code exempts churches from filing a Form 990, however, even though
other religious organizations do not enjoy such a privilege." Televangelists have
craftily met the Service's fluid test for qualifying as a "church" and succeeded in
hiding relevant financial records. As such, Congress should amend § 6033(a)(3)
and require a Form 990 from churches. Unlike amending the Church Audit
Procedures Act, however, revoking the Form 990 exemption would require much
more congressional resolve. Churches have vigorously opposed such efforts in the
past.1 7 Historically, however, these objections overwhelmingly derive more from
anti-government rhetoric rather than actual constitutional law.
Because the shadows have aided televangelists' gaming of the tax system,
Congress should repeal § 6033(a)(3). First, § 6033(a)(3)'s revocation would not
violate either the Establishment or the Free Exercise Clause. In fact, § 6033(a)(3)

"o

41

26 U.S.C. § 7611(a)(2) (2015).

1 Bunett, Can a Teleision Network Be a Church?, supra note 123.
142

Id

143 See26 U.S.C. § 6033(a) (2015).
144Id.
145 See Memorandum from Pattara & Barnett, supra note 129, at 20 ("In determining which
organizations to examine (and in determining whether the organizations selected for examination are
complying with the tax laws), the IRS relies heavily on the information supplied in the Form 990.").
'"26 U.S.C. § 6033(a)(3).
147 See Ken Walker, Sorry 666: Churches Fear 990 More, CHRISTIANITY TODAY (July 24, 2014),
http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2014/jsuly-august/sorry-666-churches-fear-990-more.html
[https://perma.cc/2JF4-336L].
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may already transgress the Establishment Clause. Second, requiring a Form 990
from churches already has some support amongst other religious organizations. In
fact, these organizations' compliance demonstrates Form 990's effectiveness, both
for the Service and even the public generally, in combating the financial abuse
perpetuated by some televangelists.
A. Section 6033(a)(3) and the FirstAmendment
Previous attempts at revoking § 6033(a)(3) have resulted in hostility from
churches.148 Specifically, churches have claimed the revocation would violate the
Free Exercise Clause. Additionally, churches contend that filing requirements
would unnecessarily entangle government in church affairs-a violation of the
Establishment Clause under the Lemon test.149 These arguments likely reflect more
rhetorical flair than actual constitutional law. In fact, the current exemption
plausibly violates the Constitution more than revocation would.
First, requiring the Form 990 from churches would not violate the Free
Exercise Clause. As noted previously, the Supreme Court has allowed some
burdens on free exercise.so Specifically the Court has noted that the collection of
tax does not impose a significant burden.151 By comparison, government filings
cannot equal a significant burden if the actual underlying taxing system does not
impose a burden. Although Senator Grassley's staff memorandum feared filing
requirements would "unnecessarily burden the overwhelming majority of
churches,"15 2 the memorandum did not cite any data supporting this contention.
The memorandum did cite, however, testimony from religious organizations not
classified as churches. These organizations flatly stated they had "no problem" with
filing Form 990s as required.s3 In fact, they even believed the filing comported
more with underlying religious beliefs rather than burdening them.' 54 If filing the
Form 990 does not burden the free exercise of regular "religious organizations,"
such a filing cannot also burden the free belief of churches. As the Grassley staff
noted, "the U.S. Constitution does not distinguish churches from other religious
organizations. The word 'church' does not appear in the Constitution; the First
148 See id.; see also Montague, supra note 46, at 219 (accusing Congress of "attacking religion by
holding the hearings and calling them 'the beginning of a new "inquisition"'") (quoting Federal Tax
Rules Applicable to Tax-Exempt OrganizationsInvolving Television Ministries: HearingBefore the
Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 100th Cong. 250 (1987) (letter from
Ben Armstrong, Exec. Dir., Nat'l Religious Broadcasters)).

1'49 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
s United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982).
1 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of California, 493 U.S. 378, 392 (1990).

152

Memorandum from Pattara & Barnett, supra note 129, at 32.

153 Id. at 28 (citing Federal Tax Rules Appcable to Tax-Exempt Organizations Involving

Television Ministries:HearingBefore Subcomm. on Oversightofthe H Comm. on Ways and Means,

100th Cong. 162 (1987)).
154

Id
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Amendment refers to 'religion,' not 'church."'"ss Additionally, churches already
honor many government regulations which could burden the church financially.
For instance, "churches routinely comply with municipal building codes and zoning
regulations in the construction and location of worship facilities."'s Compliance
with these government regulations further demonstrates how the Form 990 would
not burden religious belief under the Free Exercise jurisprudence. Even if filing the
Form 990 does pose some burden on churches, the government has a compelling
interest outweighing the burden."s' "A sound tax system requires accountability
from organizations that receive special tax benefits such as exemption from federal
income tax."'
Second, filing the Form 990 would not excessively entangle the government in
religious affairs. The government already requires Form 990s from other religious
organizations. 15 9 In receiving these forms, the Service does not inquire into the
religious organizations' beliefs. Rather, the Service focuses on the financial data
supplied by the Form. In Hemandez, the Supreme Court recognized that routine
inquiries into financial data did not constitute the entanglement envisioned by the
First Amendment. 6 0 The Court noted "routine regulatory interaction which
involves no inquiries into religious doctrine, no delegation of state power to a
religious body, and no 'detailed monitoring and dose administrative contact'
between secular and religious bodies, does not of itself violate the nonentanglement
command."' 6
The current exemption actually entangles the government more with religion
than otherwise. Because only churches-and not "religious organizations"
generally-receive exemption from the Form 990 filing, the Service has come up
with a cumbersome fourteen-point test in determining what actually constitutes a
church.1 62 This necessarily involves some examination of the purported churches'
religious beliefs. Both courts and religious organizations have expressed discomfort
towards the Service's definition. The Court of Federal Claims recently noted "[t]he
regime appears to favor some forms of religious expression over others ... which .
. the court finds troubling when considered in light of the constitutional
protections of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses."6" Congressional
testimony from the Reverend Oral Roberts expressed similar concerns: "I think the
Id. at 17.
Montague, supra note 46, at 260 n.362 (citing Michele Estrin Gilman, "CharitableChoice"and
the Accountabilty Challenge-Reconcilng the Needfor Regulation with the Ph-stAmendment Region
Clauses, 55 VAND. L. REv. 799, 877 n.383 (2002)).
117 See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58
(1982).
1ss Memorandum from Pattara & Barnett, supra note 129, at 18.
11 See id. at 28.
'60 Hernandez v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 696 (1989).
161 Id. at 696-97 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Aguilar v. Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Educ., 473
U.S. 402, 414 (1985)).
16 See 26 C.F.R. § 1.511-2(a)(3)(ii) (2016); Lutheran Soc. Serv. of Minn. v. United States, 758
F.2d 1283, 1286-87 (8th Cir. 1985).
163 Found. of Human Understanding v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 203, 217 (2009).
1ss
116
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IRS has a real problem because they will say to one group you are a church, and to
another group, you are not."1
Scientology's long battle with the Service demonstrates the government's
Byzantine entanglement under the current statutory framework. The Service
revoked the Church of Scientology's tax-exempt status in 1967 and continually
fought the Church over a lengthy twenty-year period before finally granting the
16
Scientology Church exempt status once more in a secret agreement. s This
litigious fight involved continual application of the Service's "church" standard,
which Scientology continually failed in the face of the Church's commercial
enterprises.'" Scientology only fought for church status-rather than merely
67
counting as a "religious organization"-in order to reap § 6033(a)(3)'s benefits.'
Revoking § 6033(a)(3) would make the Service's "church" definition
superfluous. All § 6033(a)(3) organizations would file the Form 990 if Congress
revoked the statutory privilege. No special benefits would exist for churches, and
the Service would thus no longer need to define a "church." This would prevent the
16
"gaming" noted by Senator Grassley's staff.

Most scholarship has coalesced

around how the Service defines a "church" as well.' In the wake of John Oliver's
satire, legal commentators debated how the Service could tighten the definition to
combat the exposed abuse.' 70 Requiring a Form 990 disclosure, however, would
altogether eliminate this tug-and-pull need for a distinct subgroup within the broad
"religious organization" category and avoid the highly litigious issue altogether.
Additionally, Congress has not offered a sufficient secular purpose in retaining
§ 6033(a)(3). The original House bill mandating Form 990 disclosure actually did
not exempt churches from filing."' Only a Senate amendment added § 6033(a)(3)'s
"church" exemption.1 72 Senator Russell Long merely argued the amendment
173
As
advanced the "view of the traditional separation of church and state."
164 Federal Tax Rules Applicable to Tax-Exempt OrganizationsInvolving Television Mnistries:
Hearing Before Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 100th Cong. 161
(1987) (statement of Rev. Oral Roberts).
165 Steven Hassan, It's 7ime to End the Church of Scientologr's Tax-Exempt Status,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 28, 2010, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steven-hassan/itstime-to-end-the-churc b_555843.html [https://perma.cc/HXH3-AVGH].
56 See Memorandum from Pattara & Barnett, supra note 129, at 21 ("Scientology is not a
'conventional' church, and had not been treated as such by the IRS for many years.").
167 See id. at 21-24.
" Id. at 28 ("This raises the question of whether church status is being gamed to shield such
activities of a tax-exempt entity from public scrutiny.").
169 See, e.g., Charles M. Whelan, "Church"in the Internal Revenue Code: The Definitional
Problems, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 885, 925 (1977) (noting the Service's definition appears based more
on "defensive tactical policy than on empirical and traditional concepts of churches.").
17 Peter J. Reilly, John Oliver Should Not Blame IRS for Televangeist Tax Abuse, FORBES (Aug.
23, 2015, 10:23 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/petesreilly/2015/08/23/john-oliver-should-notblame-irs-for-televangelist-tax-abuse/#659f43bl7f12 [https://perma.cc/ANG5-GY7N].
171 Montague, supranote 46, at 215.
1 72
I
173 Id. (quoting 115 CONG. REC. 32,148 (1969)).
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demonstrated above, however, the Service's need for defining "church" has instead
Iuither entangled the two spheres. Absent an underlying secular purpose, the §
6033(a)(3) church exemption likely violates Lemon's first prong.
B. Form 990 Has Rehgious Support andPrecedentialValue
Revoking § 6033(a)(3) would not only have constitutional validity but would
also have religious support. Senator Grassley's recent investigation of televangelists
deferred to self-regulation.1 74 For support, Senator Grassley turned to the
Evangelical Council for Financial Accountability ("ECFA").17 ' The esteemed
Reverend Billy Graham founded the ECFA in 1979 in order to support
organizations that "have demonstrated adherence to certain financial standards and
best practices."7' Mter Senator Grassley's probe, the ECFA ultimately concluded
Congress should never "pass legislation requiring churches to file Form 990 or any
similar information return."1 7 7 Instead, the ECFA encouraged that "'churches
should, as a best practice, establish appropriate measures to verifiably demonstrate'
financial oversight."'7 8

Yet independent financial oversight has failed since the ECFA's report in 2012.
Recently, Kenneth Copeland made headlines once more when he tried justifying
his private aircraft ownership. "[Y]ou can't manage [flying public] today," the
prosperity gospel-toting minister exclaimed, refusing to "get in a long tube with a
bunch of demons." 7 1 Copeland's quixotic explanation demonstrates he has no
intention of financial self-policing anytime soon. A ministry linking divine blessing
with financial exuberance has no reason for curbing the excessive tax abuse. In fact,
most of the organizations targeted by Senator Grassley's investigation have not
even received accreditation from the ECFA.'80 As a result, even other evangelical
ministers, such as the Reverend Oral Roberts, do not see self-policing as an
effective remedy.'' Reverend Roberts contended the ECFA lacked the appropriate
teeth necessary for enforcement.18 2 The ECFA even admitted in 1987 that selfBurnett, Onscreen, supra note 5.
Id.
176 Montague, supra note 46, at 255.
174
175

1n COMM'N ON ACCOUNTABILITY & POLICY FOR RELIGIOUS ORGS., ENHANCING
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE RELIGIOUS & BROADER NONPROFIT SECTOR 31 (Dec. 2012),

http://religiouspolicycommission.org/CommissionReport.aspx.
17s Montague, supra note 46, at 209 (quoting COMM'N ON ACCOUNTABILITY & POLICY FOR
RELIGIOUS ORGS., ENHANCING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE RELIGIOUS & BROADER NONPROFIT

SECTOR 31 (Dec. 2012), http://religiouspolicycommission.org/CommissionReport.aspx).
17' Jessica Chasmar, Televangelsts Defend PrivateJets: Commercial Planes Full of "Demons",
WASH. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jan/5/kenneth-copelandjesse-duplantis-defend-private-je/ [https://perma.cc/7RVN-3SVP].
Burnett, Onscreen, supra note 5.
I See Memorandum from Pattara &Barnett, supranote 129, at 27.
112 Federal Tax Rules Applicable to Tax-Exempt OrganizationsInvolving Television Ministries:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 100th Cong. 158
(1987) (statement of Rev. Oral Roberts).
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regulation posed inherent difficulties because a church must consent to the
regulations.' Gordon D. Loux, Chairman of the Board of the ECFA in 1987,
stated that a Form 990 disclosure should constitute a "minimal requirement" for all
tax-exempt entities. 8 4
Given self-policing's failure, many religious figures have started favoring
revoking § 6033(a)(3).' Some religious figures have even suggested churches think
about getting out of the tax benefit business altogether.18 1 Others think the mild
Form 990 requirement would better serve the current system. Tellingly, religious
organizations not classified as churches overwhelmingly support revoking §
6033(a)(3).117 Furthermore, the aforementioned Reverend Billy Grahamuniversally renowned in evangelical cirdes-has continuously called for financial
transparency from churches.1 8s Reverend Graham classifies his organization as a
"para-church" and refuses gaming the Service's definition of church to qualify for §
6033(a)(3)'s shield."' Spokesman Mark DeMoss noted: "For the Graham
organization, the transparency has not been a challenge . . . ."'90 Furthermore, the
leading evangelical magazine Christianity Today has both consistently supported
19
financial transparency while revealing abuse from Christian ministries. ' The
editorial board even opined: "Although churches ... aren't legally required to make
financial statements available, they are morally obligated to do so."' 92 Furthermore,
the editors harshly criticized churches that did not voluntarily file a Form 990,
alleging these ministries "were shortsighted, ignorant of reality, and out of step
93
with their 'higher obligation' to be transparent in all their doings."' If both the
Reverend Billy Graham and Christianity Today endorse revocation of §
6033(a)(3), public opinion might not sway so easily when the televangelists
inevitably object.
Additionally, Form 990 disclosures have worked in the past. Franklin Graham,
son of the famous evangelist and current Chief Executive Officer of Billy Graham
Evangelistic Association, found himself under fire after a local newspaper when

Id. at 207 (statement of Gordon D. Loux, Chairman of the Bd., ECFA).
1" Montague, supra note 46, at 220.
11s See Reilly, supra note 8.
183

186

_d

7Memorandum

from Pattara & Barnett, supra note 129, at 27.

188 Burnett, Can a Television Network Be a Church?, supra note 123; see also Montague, supra
note 46, at 254-55.
189 Montague, supra note 46, at 255 (citing Rev. Graham's strength as never thinking "that he was
beyond temptation or that anything he wanted to do was all right.").
19 Burnett, Can a Television Network Be a Church?, supra note 123.
191 Montague, supra note 46, at 256.
192
Open-book
Ministry,
CHRISTIANTY
TODAY
(Jan.
1,
2003),
http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2003/january/30.30.html [https://perma.cc/HK2K-S9YE].
193 Montague, supra note 46, at 256 (quoting Open-book Afnistry, CHRISTIANITY TODAY (Jan. 1,
2003)).
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data from a Form 990 revealed his large salary.1 4 Graham subsequently took a pay
cut as a result.' Similarly, a Washington Post probe into Smithsonian finances
resulted in pressure from Senator Grassley-ultimately resulting in the Chief
Executive's resignation.' 96 Public disclosure via the Form 990 will likely result in
similar pressure from congregants and media watchdogs such that the Service need
not even conduct an audit. Given resistance, however, the Service would need a
Form 990 for a successful audit. Otherwise the data would remain hidden.
National Public Radio, for instance, investigated and discovered relevant financial
information on Daystar Television-a television ministry classified as a church
under the Service's current test.1 97 The investigation revealed a mere 5% of
9
Daystar's expenses went toward the "needy."`
In fact, the probe unveiled where
the large majority of funds did go: $433,000 tax-deductible donations to the Oral
Roberts University, where the ministry's children attended; $296,091 to the family
church; and $60,000 to Israeli lawyers who helped Daystar secure a cable contract
in Israel.'99 These expenses give a prima facie impression of private inurement. A
Form 990 would publicly disclose all these results. Such a disclosure could result in
pressure from supporters and actual change for ministries such as Daystar
Television. Absent change from such pressure, the hard data could certainly form a
"reasonable basis" for a church audit. Either avenue results in correcting the current
abuse perpetuated in the system.
Unlike amending the Church Audit Procedures Act, Congress may have a
harder time revoking § 6033(a)(3). Some religious leaders
specially those with
the heaviest stakes in maintaining the status quo-will lobby hard against such a
measure. These voices succeeded once before in Senator Grassley's deferral after his
investigation.200 Given self-policing's failure in the intervening five years, however,
Congress has a stronger case in amending the Code and revoking § 6033(a)(3).
Senator Grassley certainly represents the best leader for such an amendment. Not
only has Senator Grassley investigated religious financial abuse for nearly thirty
years, but the Iowan also has strong support amongst evangelicals.20' The
conservative Family Research Council recently gave Senator Grassley high marks in

'* Tim Funk & Ames Alexander, Frankin Graham: Take Awar BGEA Pay, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER (Aug.
4, 2015, 11:22 AM), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/specialreports/artide29936640.html [https://perma.cc/S7RW-QV9U].
'95 Id
196 James V. Grimaldi, Smithsonian Head's Expenses 'Lavish,'AuditSays, WASH. POST (Feb. 25,
2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/artide/2007/02/24/AR2007022401510.htm
[https://perma.cc/6ZY5-KGDC]; see also Jacqueline Trescott & James V. Grimaldi, Smithsonian's
Small Quits in Wake oflInquiry, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/artide/2007/03/26/AR2007032600643.html [https://perma.cc/F46L-DG3N].
'" Burnett, Can a Television Network Be a Church?, supra note 123.
'9

Id.

199Id
200 See Burnett, Onscreen, supra note 5 (noting church leaders "cried religious persecution" during
Senator Grassley's investigation).
201 See Montague, supra note 46,
at 231.
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both halves of the 112th CongreSS 202 and the first half of the 113th Congress, 203
criticizing only his voting for judicial appellate nominees. 204 Senator Grassley even
received a perfect score from the Council in the 110th Congress. 205 A broad
coalition of respected evangelical leaders, led by Senator Grassley in Congress and
armed with the failure of self-policing, could take action over the televangelists'
protestations. 2o
CONCLUSION

Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis once commented: "Sunlight is said to be
the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.'o" Combating
the abuse exposed by John Oliver starts with shining light into the long shadows
cast by the shady televangelists gaming our tax system. Congress should amend the
Church Audit Procedures Act and name the Internal Revenue Service
Commissioner as an appropriate "high-level Treasury official" for signing off on
church audits. Although the Commissioner oversees several other responsibilities,
only the Commissioner has the sufficient publicity to satisfy the original
congressional intent in passing the Church Audit Procedures Act. Furthermore,
both religious leaders on the one hand and watchdogs on the other should find the
choice amenable; thus, Congress should have few if any problems providing the fix.
Congress should also repeal 26 U.S.C. § 6033(a)(2)(A)(i) and have churches
file the same Form 990 required for every other exempt entity, including other
"religious organizations." Unlike amending the Church Audit Procedures Act, this
measure would likely receive stiff opposition from some religious organizations.
However, the evidence supporting the repeal outweighs the flimsy constitutional
arguments on the other side. First, the repeal would not violate the First
Amendment. In fact, § 6033(a)(2)(A)(i) likely alreadyviolates the Establishment
Clause by necessitating a Byzantine test for determining whether an entity
constitutes a "religious organization" or a "church"-with the latter receiving much
more favorable treatment without any underlying secular purpose. Second, several
religious organizations support requiring a Form 990 disclosure from churches.
202 FAILY RESEARCH COUNCIL, VOTE SCORECARD 112TH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION (2011)

(giving Senator Grassley an 85% rating); see also FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL, VOTE SCORECARD
112TH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION (2012) (giving Senator Grassley an 85% rating).
203 FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL, VOTE SCORECARD 113TH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION (2014)

(giving Senator Grassley an 89% rating).
See id. (negatively ranking Senator Grassley for affirming Judge William Kayatta); see also

a

FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL, VOTE SCORECARD 112TH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION (2012)

(negatively ranking Senator Grassley for affirming Judge Michael Fitzgerald).
2 FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL, VOTE SCORECARD 11(0H CONGRESS FIRST SESSION (2008).
" See Jacqueline L. Salmon, Probe Biased, Televangelists Say, WASH. POST (May 24, 2008),

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/23/AR20080523026
[https://perma.cc/6F55-3Z2B].
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Such diverse entities as Billy Graham to the Reverend Oral Roberts have vocalized
support for more financial transparency in churches. Finally, Form 990 disclosure
has resulted in pressure-from media disclosure straight to the halls of Congresswhich has effectively regulated other nonprofit institutions without even reaching
the Service's auditing stage.
These solutions should inspire more confidence in the enforcement of the
Code. With these enactments, Congress will finally effectuate the ancient Biblical
warning: "Do not be deceived: God cannot be mocked. A man reaps what he
sows."208

20 Galatians6:7.

